The United States and Saudi Arabia have finalised a draft nuclear cooperation agreement that would permit Riyadh to enrich uranium and reprocess plutonium without adopting the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol, according to documents and multiple sources familiar with the negotiations. The so-called “123 Agreement,” which sets the legal framework for transferring US nuclear material and technology for a civilian programme, was concluded in October 2025 but has not been signed by President Donald Trump nor submitted to Congress for the legally required review. The arrangement would rely on bilateral safeguards between Washington and Riyadh rather than the enhanced IAEA inspections that most recipient states accept, a structure that non-proliferation specialists describe as unprecedented for a pact of this kind.

Viewed from Washington, the White House has pointed to a statement by Energy Secretary Chris Wright, who announced the end of negotiations and said the accord, together with bilateral safeguard agreements, would “maintain a firm commitment to non-proliferation.” The Saudi embassy in the US capital did not respond to requests for comment. Congressional sources, however, indicate that the administration is withholding the draft from lawmakers partly out of concern that a bipartisan resolution of disapproval could block the deal. Two sources told CNN that the ongoing war with Iran—launched, according to Trump, in part to prevent Tehran from weaponising its enriched uranium—has contributed to the delay. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has previously stated that the kingdom would seek its own nuclear weapons should Iran acquire a bomb.

The absence of the Additional Protocol means IAEA inspectors would lack the authority to conduct short-notice visits to undeclared sites, a limitation that analysts in European and Middle Eastern capitals say could allow Saudi Arabia to develop a latent weapons capability. The draft agreement marks a departure from the so-called “gold standard” set by the 2009 US-UAE nuclear pact, under which Abu Dhabi voluntarily renounced enrichment and reprocessing and accepted the Additional Protocol. The US administration, in a 2025 report to Congress cited by sources, argued that the bilateral safeguards include “additional verification measures in the most sensitive areas” and that the IAEA would still have a role, though not under the enhanced framework. Details of any enrichment limits remain unclear.

Proponents within the US government and industry argue that the deal secures a lucrative commercial market for American nuclear firms and prevents Saudi Arabia from turning to Russian or Chinese suppliers, who might impose even fewer safeguards. Critics in non-proliferation circles and among European allies counter that bypassing the IAEA standard weakens the global non-proliferation architecture and could set a precedent for other states seeking similar concessions. The dossier now rests with President Trump, whose signature is required before the agreement is transmitted to Congress, where it would face a statutory review period and the possibility of legislative obstruction.