The World Bank has formally reversed its decades-old opposition to industrial policy, acknowledging in a new report that such measures are “back with a vengeance” and that 183 of the world’s 195 countries now target at least one industry. The report’s chief economist describes the institution’s earlier advice as having “the practical value of a floppy disk today.” According to the bank’s analysis, the turn reflects a convergence of forces: slowing global growth, supply-chain vulnerabilities exposed by the pandemic, the scale of the energy transition, geopolitical fragmentation, security competition around semiconductors, and the emergence of artificial intelligence. Viewed from Washington, the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 illustrates the logic: a $52.7 billion federal commitment catalysed over $540 billion in private investment across more than 100 projects, a pattern the bank frames as activating markets rather than replacing them.

In Tehran, former senior diplomats interpret these shifts as part of a broader, painful transition toward a multipolar order. Mohsen Pak-Ayeen, a former ambassador, cited the view of Iran’s late revolutionary leader that new orders emerge not from sudden events but through a gradual process combining unforeseen shocks—political and military storms that can serve as midwives. He pointed to the Ukraine war and the October 7 operation as unpredictable developments that are reshaping Eurasia and West Asia, and argued that Iran will be among the main actors in the emerging configuration, alongside China and Russia, while the American role diminishes and Israel faces decline. Pak-Ayeen stressed that no historical order has been born without cost, noting the loss of Iranian leaders and commanders as part of the price for paving the way toward what he termed a new Islamic civilisation.

A separate interview with former ambassador Mohammad Masjed-Jamei offered a complementary but distinct Iranian perspective, emphasising strategic restraint. He recalled how Ayatollah Khamenei’s opposition to military intervention after the Taliban’s attack on Iran’s consulate in Mazar-i-Sharif averted a prolonged and unpredictable conflict. Masjed-Jamei argued that even Eastern powers trust a balanced Iran more, and that the country must avoid costly crises while pursuing its “Look to the East” policy not as unconditional alignment but as a strategic orientation within a multipolar framework. From this vantage point, the rise of BRICS and the steady growth of China are objective indicators that the post-Cold War unipolar moment is receding, and that maintaining equilibrium between power blocs is essential for maximising national leverage.

These national strategies unfold against a backdrop that analysts in Europe describe as a moment when decisions, not inevitability, drive history. The Ghana Report, reflecting on the legacy of Gdańsk’s shipyard strikes, notes that post-war reconstruction, democratic transitions, and the international response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine all demonstrate that leadership is tested most when the path ahead is uncertain. The same analysis warns that delayed decisions—reforms postponed, institutions neglected, public trust allowed to erode—rarely self-correct and instead pass costs to future generations. As governments from Washington to Beijing and Tehran recalibrate the role of the state in steering economies and security, the dossier remains open: the lasting significance of today’s industrial policies and geopolitical repositioning will be determined only afterwards, when commitments translate into measurable outcomes and the cumulative weight of choices reveals whether societies are left more secure and resilient.