The United States and Saudi Arabia signed a civil nuclear cooperation agreement on 22 July that opens a legal pathway for the kingdom to enrich uranium on its own soil, according to the US Department of Energy. The 30-year pact, known as a 123 Agreement, was signed by Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman alongside a bilateral safeguards accord. It does not include the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol, which permits snap inspections, nor does it require Riyadh to forswear enrichment or reprocessing—the so-called “gold standard” applied to the 2009 US-UAE nuclear deal. Instead, a joint US-Saudi study will assess the feasibility of building an American-operated enrichment facility, with a ten-year prohibition on independent Saudi enrichment should Washington ultimately object.

Viewed from Washington, the agreement is framed as a strategic and commercial win. The Trump administration argues it will secure tens of billions of dollars for US firms such as Westinghouse, create high-wage jobs, and lock Riyadh into American technology while excluding Russian and Chinese competitors. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, speaking in Manila, stated that “the US is not going to reach any agreement with any country in the world that leads to the risk of proliferation.” Saudi officials, for their part, have long insisted on the right to a full civilian nuclear fuel cycle, citing domestic uranium reserves and plans to diversify energy sources under Vision 2030. The deal was decoupled from any requirement to normalise ties with Israel, a condition that had been central to earlier Biden-era negotiations.

Regional and non-proliferation experts, however, warn the pact marks a departure from decades of US policy. Analysts at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London describe it as “a revolutionary new approach” that transfers sensitive technology without the highest available oversight. Israeli opposition figures and former defence officials have called the agreement a “severe strategic failure,” warning it could trigger a nuclear arms race in a region already destabilised by the US-led war against Iran. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has previously stated that Saudi Arabia would seek a nuclear weapon if Iran acquired one. The omission of the Additional Protocol, according to one US official, reflects Saudi reluctance to allow inspectors access to sites such as royal palaces or Mecca, but it leaves verification largely in bilateral hands.

The agreement now moves to the US Congress for a mandatory 90-session-day review. Democratic lawmakers, including Senator Edward Markey and Representative Brad Sherman, have signalled strong opposition, arguing the deal undermines the very non-proliferation rationale Washington cites for its military campaign against Iran. Republican leaders have expressed conditional support, with Senate Foreign Relations Committee chair Jim Risch welcoming the pact while pledging to scrutinise its details. Unless Congress passes a joint resolution of disapproval—and musters a two-thirds majority to override a likely presidential veto—the agreement will enter into force. The IAEA Board of Governors will also need to ratify the bilateral safeguards arrangement, adding a further layer of international scrutiny to a dossier that is set to reshape nuclear governance in the Middle East.