In a single week, leaders in El Salvador, Senegal and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have taken formal steps to reshape constitutional rules in ways that would prolong their hold on power or reconfigure executive authority. In San Salvador, President Nayib Bukele registered his candidacy for a third consecutive term in 2027, a move enabled by a 2025 constitutional reform that introduced indefinite presidential re-election and shortened his current mandate to three years. In Dakar, the National Assembly passed a package of amendments that expand parliamentary oversight, create a new Constitutional Court and bar a sitting president from leading a political party, a measure widely interpreted as targeting President Bassirou Diomaye Faye. In Kinshasa, the Senate adopted a bill that would reset presidential term limits, clearing a path for President Félix Tshisekedi to seek a third term after 2028, with the government citing insecurity in the east as a reason elections cannot be held on schedule.

Each process is justified by its proponents in distinct institutional terms. Bukele’s Nuevas Ideas party, which holds a legislative supermajority, frames indefinite re-election as a democratic norm already applied to mayors and deputies, and points to approval ratings above 80% driven by a security crackdown that slashed homicide rates. In Senegal, the Pastef party of parliamentary speaker Ousmane Sonko – a former prime minister who fell out with President Faye – argues the reforms strengthen the separation of powers by giving lawmakers greater investigative authority and requiring the government to disclose natural-resource agreements. The DRC’s ruling coalition, which dominates both chambers, insists that a referendum on a new constitution is necessary because the eastern conflict makes a 2028 vote impossible, and that any extension would require popular endorsement.

Opposition forces and civil society groups across the three countries describe the moves as institutional coups. In El Salvador, human rights organisations and regional commentators note that the 2025 reform was approved in a single day without prior debate, and that mass detentions under a state of exception have eroded due process even as they delivered public safety. Senegalese opposition MPs walked out of the parliamentary session, and the Catholic Church, through the National Episcopal Conference of Congo, has denounced the DRC bill, warning that low public trust – only 12% of Congolese express confidence in electoral processes – risks pushing political competition toward armed mobilisation. A columnist in Mexico, writing as Bukele registered, labelled any politician who manipulates rules to remain in power “a traitor to democracy”, a sentiment echoed by critics who see a pattern stretching from Central America to the Andes and West Africa.

The diplomatic and security implications are already being weighed. Analysts in Kinshasa caution that a legitimacy crisis could weaken the government’s ability to internationalise the conflict with M23 rebels and maintain Western pressure on Rwanda, a strategy that has proved more effective than military operations. In Senegal, the justice minister announced that the constitutional changes would be submitted to a referendum, but Sonko has publicly questioned the president’s authority to do so, signalling that the power struggle between the two former allies is far from resolved. Meanwhile, the DRC’s constitutional review advances even as President Tshisekedi receives diplomatic felicitations from Morocco’s King Mohammed VI, who on the country’s independence anniversary stressed “privileged ties” and “ambitious cooperation” between the two nations. The Salvadoran primaries are set for 12 July, with no internal challenger expected; Senegal’s referendum date remains unannounced; and the DRC bill now moves toward a referendum whose timing is equally uncertain.