Bilateral trade between Russia and China rose 25.6% year-on-year in the first half of 2026, reaching $134.2 billion, according to data released by Russia’s trade mission in Beijing. Russian exports, dominated by energy, grew 23.3% to $73.6 billion, while imports of Chinese goods climbed 28.4% to $60.6 billion, leaving Moscow with a trade surplus. The rebound, which reverses a contraction in 2025, was hailed by President Vladimir Putin as evidence of “steady” momentum. Yet the headline figures obscure a deepening asymmetry: China now accounts for roughly 40% of Russia’s foreign trade, while Russia represents less than 4% of China’s total, a ratio that Western analysts say has transformed a once near-equal partnership into a relationship of dependence.

That dependence was laid bare during Putin’s visit to Beijing in May. According to US media reports citing sources close to the negotiations, Chinese officials told Gazprom chief executive Alexei Miller that Beijing would only sign off on the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline if Moscow supplied gas at prices equivalent to Russia’s subsidised domestic market. The demand, which one source described as effectively asking Russia to finance the project, was accompanied by a request that the Russian side not raise the matter again until its terms changed. The pipeline, designed to carry 50 billion cubic metres of gas annually via Mongolia, remains unsigned, despite earlier Kremlin assertions that a deal was imminent. Viewed from Brussels, the episode illustrates a broader pattern: China is using its market heft to extract concessions, a dynamic that also prompted the European Union this week to signal emergency import curbs on Chinese goods after the bloc’s trade deficit with Beijing widened by almost a quarter in the first half of the year.

The shifting balance has prompted a reassessment in Western capitals. A report in the US financial press, citing current and former officials, concluded that Putin, once admired by Xi Jinping as a “role model,” has become a junior partner. The same report detailed how Beijing is quietly cultivating ties with mid-level Russian officials and elites who might shape a post-Putin Russia, a move interpreted in Washington as an effort to lock in influence regardless of who rules the Kremlin. Moscow’s response was swift: spokesman Dmitry Peskov rejected any characterisation of Russia as a “junior partner,” insisting the relationship is built on equality and mutual respect. China’s foreign ministry similarly stressed the “high level of mutual trust and deep friendship” between the two leaders.

Despite the public denials, the structural imbalance is unlikely to ease soon. Russia’s access to Western energy markets remains curtailed, leaving it reliant on Chinese purchases of discounted oil. Meanwhile, Beijing’s negotiating posture on Power of Siberia 2 suggests it sees little urgency to accommodate Moscow’s desire to redirect gas flows away from Europe. The EU, for its part, is preparing safeguard measures—tariffs and quotas on a case-by-case basis—that its trade officials say could become necessary before an October deadline, as they see no sign of structural rebalancing by China. The next concrete step in the Russia-China dossier will be whether Moscow revises its pricing offer; in Brussels, the focus is on which sectors will be targeted first.