The most striking signal of Venezuela’s new direction came with the reactivation of the long-dormant Loran gas field. After 23 years of neglect, the interim government of Delcy Rodríguez granted a licence to Shell for the first phase of exploration and production at the offshore megafield, which straddles the maritime border with Trinidad and Tobago. The deal, formalised on 11 June, unlocks a project that holds seven gas reservoirs and could transform Venezuela into a significant exporter of natural gas. Viewed from London, Shell’s return marks a cautious but strategic bet on a country that is rapidly pivoting from two decades of statist energy policy under Nicolás Maduro.

That pivot is equally visible in the power sector. Rodríguez, who was sworn in after US forces seized Maduro in January, announced a memorandum of understanding with GE Vernova to rebuild Venezuela’s crumbling electricity grid. The plan targets 1 gigawatt of restored capacity within 24 months and more than 5 GW over four years, addressing chronic blackouts that have paralysed industry and daily life. In parallel, Argentina’s Impsa — a heavy-engineering firm recently brought under state control by President Javier Milei’s government — signed an agreement to complete the Tocoma hydroelectric plant, a 2,200 MW project that has languished unfinished for years. Impsa will also undertake other strategic works on the national grid, a move that Buenos Aires frames as both commercial pragmatism and regional solidarity.

On the hydrocarbons front, state-owned PDVSA and Spain’s Repsol signed a memorandum of understanding to expand exploration in the eastern Lake Maracaibo region, where the two companies already operate a joint venture, Petroquiriquire. The accord, announced in Caracas, signals Madrid’s willingness to deepen energy ties with a government that is actively courting foreign capital. Analysts in Washington note that the deals collectively represent a sharp break with the Maduro era, when nationalisations and mismanagement drove most Western majors to exit or scale back operations.

The interim administration’s embrace of foreign firms has drawn both praise and scrutiny. Supporters argue that opening the energy sector is essential to stabilising the economy and restoring basic services. Critics, however, caution that the same political elite remains in control of key institutions, and that the flurry of memoranda must translate into enforceable contracts and on-the-ground delivery. From Buenos Aires, the Impsa deal is seen as a test of Milei’s unorthodox model: a libertarian president using a state-owned company to secure a foothold in a market that is itself emerging from decades of state-dominated dysfunction.

Looking ahead, the success of these initiatives will depend on the interim government’s ability to provide legal certainty, security, and a stable regulatory framework. The Loran gas project, if fully developed, could eventually supply liquefied natural gas to global markets, easing Europe’s energy concerns. The grid and hydroelectric works promise to end blackouts that have crippled Venezuelan households and industry. Yet the path from memorandum to megawatts is long, and the political foundations of the post-Maduro order remain fragile. For now, the sheer breadth of the deals — from Shell to Repsol, from GE Vernova to Impsa — suggests that Venezuela is betting big on a rapid, investor-led recovery.