The most significant strain in the Taiwan Strait is currently financial rather than kinetic: a $14 billion US arms sale package, requested by Taipei, remains frozen in Washington’s post-summit caution. President Donald Trump, having discussed the proposal “in great detail” with China’s Xi Jinping during his May visit to Beijing, has signalled no immediate willingness to approve new sales. Multiple sources suggest that, in the near term, no fresh arms announcements are likely, and there has been no movement towards arranging a direct call between Trump and Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te—a restraint that stands in marked contrast to the protocol-shattering Trump-Tsai phone call of 2016. Taiwan’s top representative in the United States, Alexander Yui, has issued an urgent public plea for the weaponry, insisting the island faces an escalating threat from Beijing and that Washington’s policy remains unchanged, even as the package languishes.

Viewed from Taipei, the impasse is a matter of existential self-defence, not provocation. President Lai, addressing foreign correspondents and visiting US lawmakers, reiterated that Taiwan’s refusal to accept unification and its efforts to safeguard democratic governance should not be interpreted as hostile acts. He pressed for expanded bilateral cooperation in defence, technology and industry, and urged Congress to pass double-taxation prevention legislation. Lai also dismissed concerns that Japan-Philippines negotiations to delimit overlapping exclusive economic zones would erode Taiwan’s maritime rights, stressing that China has no claim to those waters. Domestically, Taipei is pushing defence spending above 3 per cent of GDP, encompassing drones, munitions and supplementary military budgets, in a bid to bolster self-reliant capabilities.

Beijing’s response has been characteristically sharp. Chinese officials condemned the arms push as a “dead end” for any independence ambitions, warning that relying on American military might would ultimately fail. Yet, in a parallel diplomatic track, China’s ambassador to Washington, Xie Feng, used a US-China Business Council gala to call for a tenfold expansion of tariff-free trade between the two powers, suggesting a basket of up to $300 billion. The juxtaposition—military pressure on Taipei alongside economic courtship of Washington—reveals a familiar dual strategy: isolate the island while deepening interdependence with its primary patron.

A newly released opinion poll inside Taiwan adds a layer of domestic complexity. Asked to identify the most important approach to safeguarding security and cross-strait peace, 44.9 per cent of respondents chose strengthening self-reliant defence capabilities, while 29.7 per cent favoured extending goodwill towards mainland China. Only 11.8 per cent prioritised deepening cooperation with the United States. The findings, gathered after the Xi-Trump meeting, suggest a public that is neither reflexively pro-American nor eager for confrontation, but rather sees indigenous defensive capacity as the essential foundation—a mood that complicates both Lai’s arms-acquisition diplomacy and Beijing’s unification narrative.

Analysts in London and Singapore note that the current restraint from Washington may prove temporary. Some arms packages are still expected to move forward, and Trump’s description of Taiwan as a “bargaining chip” has not been retracted. Lai, for his part, has vowed the island “will not be sacrificed or traded”. The fragile stability across the strait now hinges on whether Trump’s post-summit caution evolves into a longer-term strategic recalibration, or merely a pause before the next cycle of brinkmanship—with Taiwan’s $14 billion request serving as the litmus test.